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[W]e have cast off the naive doctrine that all science is necessarily 
true and that all true knowledge is necessarily scientific . . . .1 
 The Supreme Court has rendered a trilogy of cases explicating the 
standards governing the admissibility of expert testimony under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702. In 1993, in the watershed case of 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,2 the Court initially 
held that the traditional common law, general acceptance admissibil-
ity standard for scientific evidence is no longer good law. The Court 
remarked that the “rigid ‘general acceptance’ requirement [was] at 
odds with the ‘liberal thrust’ of the Federal Rules and their ‘general 
approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to opinion testimony.’”3 
                                                                                                                    
 * Visiting Professor of Law, University College Dublin; Professor of Law, University 
of California at Davis; B.A. 1967, J.D. 1969, University of San Francisco; former Chair, 
Evidence Section, American Association of Law Schools. 
 1. JOHN ZIMAN, RELIABLE KNOWLEDGE: AN EXPLORATION OF THE GROUNDS FOR 
BELIEF IN SCIENCE 2 (1978) (emphasis omitted). 
 2. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 3. Id. at 588 (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)).  
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The Court noted that Article VII of the Federal Rules, governing 
opinion testimony, omitted any language that could reasonably bear 
the construction that it codified a “general acceptance” requirement. 
In the Court’s words, “[g]iven the Rules’ permissive backdrop,”4 that 
omission had the effect of abolishing the traditional requirement. 
 Then the Daubert Court proceeded to derive a new standard from 
the statutory text of Rule 702.5 Justice Blackmun pointed out that 
the statute refers to “scientific . . . knowledge,” and opted for a meth-
odological definition of “scientific knowledge.”6 He ruled that, to be 
sufficiently reliable to be admissible, a purportedly scientific proposi-
tion must be supported by “appropriate validation.”7 To provide guid-
ance to trial judges, Justice Blackmun listed several factors that trial 
judges may weigh in evaluating the soundness of the underlying sci-
entific methodology, including such considerations as whether the 
expert’s hypothesis has been tested;8 whether the theory has been 
subjected to peer review;9 “the known or potential rate of error”;10 and 
“the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the tech-
nique’s operation.”11 However, the Justice emphasized both that the 
list was not “definitive”12 and that “[t]he inquiry envisioned by Rule 
702 is . . . a flexible one.”13 
 In 1997, the Court revisited the topic of scientific testimony and 
handed down its decision in General Electric Co. v. Joiner.14 The for-
mal holding in Joiner is that on appeal, the proper scope of review of 
a trial judge’s ruling is whether the judge abused his or her discre-
tion.15 The Court took the occasion to amplify on the validation stan-
dard enunciated in Daubert. In the lead opinion in Joiner, Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist asserted: 
[N]othing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence re-
quires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected 
to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert. A court may 
conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between 
the data and the opinion proffered.16 
                                                                                                                    
 4. Id. at 589. 
 5. FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 6. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593, 593-95; see Werner v. Pittway Corp., 90 F. Supp. 2d 
1018, 1031 (W.D. Wis. 2000) (“At its essence, science is methods.”) (emphasis omitted). 
 7. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.  
 8. Id. at 593. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 594. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 593. 
 13. Id. at 594.  
 14. 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
 15. Id. at 143.  
 16. Id. at 146.  
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 In 1999, the Court completed the trilogy by deciding Kumho Tire 
Co. v. Carmichael.17 While the proponents of the testimony in 
Daubert and Joiner characterized their evidence as “scientific” in na-
ture, in Kumho the proponents argued that their testimony qualified 
as non-scientific expert evidence. As they correctly pointed out, Rule 
702 refers in the alternative to “scientific, technical or other special-
ized knowledge.”18 The question posed was the degree, if any, to 
which Daubert extended to non-scientific expertise. On the one hand, 
Justice Breyer, writing for the majority, acknowledged that it would 
be unduly rigid to mandate that the trial judge assess the admissibil-
ity of non-scientific expertise solely in terms of the factors listed in 
Daubert.19 After all, that list had been devised with scientific meth-
odology in mind. The species of non-scientific expertise are so varie-
gated that the Court could “neither rule out, nor rule in, for all cases 
and for all time the applicability of the factors mentioned in 
Daubert.”20 On the other hand, the Court forcefully rejected any sug-
gestion that non-scientific expertise is wholly exempt from “Daubert-
style scrutiny”21 of its reliability. Justice Breyer explained: 
In Daubert, the Court specified that it is the Rule’s word “knowl-
edge,” not the words (like “scientific”) that modify that word, that 
“establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability.” Hence, as a mat-
ter of language, . . . Rule [702] applies its reliability standard to all 
“scientific,” “technical,” or “other specialized” matters within its 
scope.22 
The Court reiterated its position in Joiner that the trial judge should 
not accept ipse dixit from an expert.23 While Joiner recognized that 
the trial judge enjoys discretion in applying the Daubert factors to 
gauge the admissibility of scientific testimony, Kumho accorded the 
judge a second, deeper type of discretion—a latitude24 to select fac-
tors which strike the judge as “reasonable measures of the reliabil-
ity” of the non-scientific expertise in question.25 
 One would think that the Court’s rendition of three opinions in 
this doctrinal area in such a short period of time would have brought 
exceptional clarity to the area and settled many, if not most, of the 
controversies. Moreover, the scholarly commentary in this area has 
                                                                                                                    
 17. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).  
 18. FED. R. EVID. 702.  
 19. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 145-46. 
 20. Id. at 150.  
 21. Id. at 158. 
 22. Id. at 147 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589-90 
(1993)) (citation omitted). 
 23. Id. at 157. 
 24. Id. at 152.  
 25. Id. at 150-52.  
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been extensive and often insightful.26 However, despite the volume of 
commentary and the Court’s frequent pronouncements in this area, 
there are still large areas of uncertainties. The uncertainties relate 
to two basic issues: What must be validated, and how can it be vali-
dated?  
 On both issues, the opinions include passages that are susceptible 
to the interpretation that the Court has established onerous re-
quirements for introducing expert testimony. For example, on the 
first issue, Kumho contains language implying that, at least in some 
cases, the trial judge should pass on the “globa[l]”27 question of the 
reliability of the expert discipline itself. In his opinion in Kumho, 
Justice Breyer mentioned a category of cases in which “the discipline 
itself lacks reliability, as, for example, do theories grounded in any 
so-called generally accepted principles of astrology and necro-
mancy.”28  
 To compound the proponent’s burden, on the second issue—how it 
must be validated—the Daubert opinion implies that “experimental” 
validation is a “canonical” requirement for demonstrating the reli-
ability of expert testimony.29 The majority approvingly quoted the 
late Sir Karl Popper’s assertion that “the criterion of the scientific 
status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or [empirical] 
testability.”30 It is no accident that at the very beginning of his list of 
relevant factors, Justice Blackmun observed that: 
Ordinarily, a key question to be answered in determining whether 
a theory or technique is [reliable] scientific knowledge . . . will be 
whether it can be (and has been) tested [empirically].31 
Considered together, the placement of that factor at the head of the 
list and the Justice’s stress on that factor indicate that that consid-
eration may be more than a mere factor. The empirical testing of the 
proposition is arguably a full-fledged requirement for admissibility 
under Daubert.32  
                                                                                                                    
 26. E.g., DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., SCIENCE IN THE LAW: STANDARDS, STATISTICS AND 
RESEARCH ISSUES Ch. 1 (2002); D. Michael Risinger, Defining the “Task at Hand”: Non-
Science Forensic Science After Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767 
(2000).  
 27. Risinger, supra note 26, at 773. 
 28. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 151.  
 29. Sheila Jasanoff, Judging Science: Issues, Assumptions, Models, in ROSCOE POUND 
FOUND., SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN THE COURTS: CONCEPTS AND CONTROVERSIES 9, 11-12 
(1997); Adina Schwartz, A “Dogma of Empiricism” Revisited: Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and the Need to Resurrect the Philosophical Insight of Frye v. United 
States, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 149 (1997); see also David Crump, The Trouble with 
Daubert-Kumho: Reconsidering the Supreme Court’s Philosophy of Science, 68 MO. L. REV. 
1 (forthcoming Apr. 2003).  
 30. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993).  
 31. Id. at 593.  
 32. See sources cited supra note 29.  
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 While the opinions in the trilogy are susceptible to the interpreta-
tion that they carry these two implications, this Article argues that 
both implications are unsound. Part I of the Article advances the 
negative contention that the trilogy of cases should not be construed 
as endorsing either implication. 
 Part II of the Article turns to the more difficult, positive task of 
identifying the proper interpretation of the trilogy on the two funda-
mental questions of “what” and “how.” Subpart II.A advocates the 
position taken recently by Professor D. Michael Risinger,33 that the 
thing that must be validated is the hypothesis that the expert can 
perform the specific “task at hand” involved—not, for example, the 
broad question of whether forensic document examination is a valid 
discipline, but instead the narrower issue of a document examiner’s 
claimed ability to identify the author of hand-printed Japanese char-
acters.34 Rather than being required to demonstrate the validity of 
the field that the expert practices in, the proponent’s only obligation 
is to show that the theory or technique in question enables the expert 
to accurately make the determination that the expert proposes testi-
fying to.  
 Subpart II.B then contends that it would be wrongminded for the 
courts to place exclusive or even primary emphasis on empirical test-
ing as a validation method. The courts should be open to a variety of 
validation techniques, including, but not limited to, empirical induc-
tion and mathematical deduction. Adopting the attitude of a skepti-
cal rationalist, the judge ought to inquire whether the results of the 
use of the technique in question demonstrate that the technique 
“works”; that is, whether the technique enables the expert to accu-
rately perform the specific task at hand. As the task itself varies, as 
when the expert puts the technique to different uses and applica-
tions, the required validation must also change.  
 Thus, this Article conceives of “appropriate validation” as a flexi-
ble, relative concept. There is no invariable requirement that the 
proponent of expert testimony demonstrate that the expert’s theory 
has been validated by empirical testing and induction. Modernly, ra-
tionalist, skeptical decisionmakers commonly rely on other modes of 
validation. Those modes should also be acceptable in the courtroom. 
Further, there is a close relationship between the “how” and the 
“what” issues. The judge cannot intelligently decide which modes of 
validation are acceptable until the judge focuses on the precise claim 
made by the expert. The judge cannot determine which types of vali-
                                                                                                                    
 33. Risinger, supra note 26. 
 34. Id. at 798-800 (discussing United States v. Fujii, No. OO CR 17, slip op. at 3-4 
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 25, 2000)). The official citation for Fujii is 152 F. Supp. 2d 939 (N.D. Ill. 
2000).  
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dation are apropos until the judge has identified the precise claim 
and task that must be validated.  
I.   WHAT THE TRILOGY DOES NOT STAND FOR: SPURIOUS CLAIMS 
ABOUT THE MEANING OF DAUBERT, JOINER, AND KUMHO 
 As previously stated, one passage in Kumho implies that the pro-
ponent has the burden of establishing the general reliability of the 
proffered expert’s discipline.35 In his lead opinion, Justice Breyer 
commented that sometimes “the discipline itself lacks reliability.”36 
The Justice cited two examples, namely, astrology and necromancy.37 
However, the trilogy contains other language pointing to the more 
sensible conclusion that the proponent need demonstrate only that 
the expert’s theory or technique can enable the expert to accurately 
make the specific determination which he or she proposes to testify 
about.38 
A.   The Language of the Opinions in the Trilogy 
 As Professor Risinger has emphasized,39 in the formal summary at 
the end of his opinion in Daubert, Justice Blackmun stated that the 
proponent’s foundation must convince the trial judge that the ex-
pert’s theory or technique is sufficiently “reliable” to perform “the 
task at hand.”40 Earlier in the opinion, in the process of explaining 
the requirement that the theory or technique “fit” the case,41 the 
Justice added that the theory or technique needs “a valid scientific 
connection to the pertinent inquiry.”42 
 Joiner43 lends itself to the same interpretation as Daubert. In 
Joiner, Chief Justice Rehnquist analyzed the question of whether the 
animal studies cited by the plaintiff were an adequate basis for the 
expert’s opinion as to the cause of Joiner’s small-cell lung cancer. The 
Chief Justice initially listed the criticisms of the animal studies.44 
The Chief Justice then wrote: 
                                                                                                                    
 35. See supra notes 21 & 22.  
 36. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 151 (1999).  
 37. Id. 
 38. See generally D. Michael Risinger, Preliminary Thoughts on a Functional Taxon-
omy of Expertise for the Post-Kumho World, in SCIENCE IN THE LAW, supra note 26, § 2-4.0, 
at 88 [hereinafter Risinger, Preliminary Thoughts]; Risinger, supra note 26; D. Michael 
Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic Science: 
Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CAL. L. REV. 3, 4 (2002); see also Teska 
v. Potlatch Corp., 184 F. Supp. 2d 913, 920 (D. Minn. 2002) (“The threshold issue before us 
is ‘specific not general’ . . . .”) (citing Kumho, 526 U.S. at 156).  
 39. Risinger, supra note 26, at 772.  
 40. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).  
 41. Id. at 591-92.  
 42. Id. at 592. 
 43. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 144 (1997). 
 44. Id.  
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Respondent [plaintiff] failed to reply to this criticism. Rather than 
explaining how and why the experts could have extrapolated their 
opinions from these seemingly far-removed animal studies, re-
spondent chose “to proceed as if the only issue [was] whether ani-
mal studies can ever be a proper foundation for an expert’s opin-
ion.” 864 F. Supp., at 1324. Of course, whether animal studies can 
ever be a proper foundation for an expert’s opinion was not the is-
sue. The issue was whether these experts’ opinions were suffi-
ciently supported by the animal studies on which they purported 
to rely.45 
Significantly, the emphasis indicated by the italics appeared in the 
Chief Justice’s original opinion. 
 The Kumho opinion is cast in the same mold.46 To begin with, 
Kumho echoes some of the key language in Daubert. For instance, 
the Kumho Court refers to “the task at hand”47 and the need for a 
demonstrated connection between the expert’s theory and “the perti-
nent inquiry.”48 More importantly, though, in reviewing the founda-
tion laid by the plaintiffs for Carlson’s expert opinion, Justice Breyer 
engaged in a highly particularized analysis: 
[C]ontrary to [plaintiffs’] suggestion, the specific issue before the 
[trial] court was not the reasonableness in general of a tire expert’s 
use of a visual and tactile inspection to determine whether overde-
flection had caused the tire’s tread to separate from its steel-belted 
carcass. Rather, it was the reasonableness of using such an ap-
proach, along with Carlson’s particular method of analyzing the 
data thereby obtained, to draw a conclusion regarding the particu-
lar matter to which the expert testimony was directly relevant.49 
Again, the emphasis is in Justice Breyer’s own text. The Justice ac-
knowledged that “as a general matter, tire abuse may often be identi-
fied . . . through visual or tactile inspection of the tire.”50 However, 
Carlson claimed to have developed a more “particular” method—
namely, a theory that there are four characteristic signs of tire abuse 
and that the absence of at least two of the signs indicates that the ac-
cident was caused by a manufacturing defect in the tire.51 A bit later 
in the opinion, the Justice emphasized that Carlson had not rested 
his opinion simply on the general theory that, in the absence of evi-
dence of abuse, a defect will normally have caused a tire’s separation. 
Rather, the expert employed a more specific theory to establish the 
                                                                                                                    
 45. Id.; see also Bourne ex rel. Bourne v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 189 F. Supp. 
2d 482, 496-97 (S.D. W. Va. 2002).  
 46. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
 47. Id. at 141. 
 48. Id. at 149. 
 49. Id. at 153-54. 
 50. Id. at 156.  
 51. Id. at 154. 
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existence (or absence) of such abuse.52 
 Still later, Justice Breyer underscored that “the question before 
the trial court was specific, not general.”53 In the next paragraph, the 
Justice stated that “[t]he particular issue in this case concerned” the 
reliability of the specific theory that Carlson had employed.54 
B.   Generally Held Epistemological Views 
 Restricting the validation requirement to the specific theory or 
technique the expert relies on is not only consistent with most of the 
language in the opinions forming the trilogy, but is also in accord 
with epistemological views generally held in our society. Any other 
interpretation of the trilogy would lead to the admission of junk ex-
pertise as well as to the exclusion of demonstrably reliable evidence. 
 Assume, for example, that the expert belongs to an established 
field of science in which there is a huge body of literature document-
ing quality experimentation validating many of the propositions cir-
culating in the field. Yet, at any given time, the discourse in the field 
will undoubtedly include a spectrum of types of propositions. In some 
cases, the propositions have such substantial supporting data that 
we can be relatively confident that we “know” the proposition to be 
true, at least as a working assumption in everyday life and industry. 
However, the discourse is also likely to include unsubstantiated con-
jectures, and worse still, speculations that will later be exposed as 
invalid.55 At one extreme, it would be premature to permit testimony 
about any theory circulating in the field simply because many, if not 
most, of the propositions being discussed in the field’s discourse have 
passed the muster of empirical validation. Inferring the truth of one 
proposition in the field from the truth of another proposition in the 
same field can be a non sequitur. Consider, for example, the disci-
pline of forensic pathology. It is true that the courts routinely accept 
pathologists’ testimony on a wide range of subjects.56 Judicial recep-
tivity to pathologists’ opinions on many subjects, such as the estima-
tion of stature from skeletal remains, is justifiable, since there is a 
substantial body of research investigating the reliability of those es-
timations.57 However, the literature in the pathology field also in-
cludes discussions of many novel conjectures, especially with respect 
to the determination of time of death.58 Despite the respected status 
                                                                                                                    
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 156.  
 54. Id. at 157. 
 55. ZIMAN, supra note 1, at 130-33.  
 56. 2 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 19-
10(B) (3d ed. 1999).  
 57. Id. § 19-4(B), at 103.  
 58. Id. § 19-8(A). 
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of the field of forensic pathology, it would be fallacious to leap to the 
conclusion that pathologists should be allowed to testify about any 
theory that has garnered a measure of attention in the field. By the 
same token, even if one posits the general reliability of the field of 
questioned document examination, that assumption does not dictate 
the admissibility of proffered testimony identifying the author of 
handwritten Japanese characters.59 
 At the other extreme, it is equally foolish to bar all testimony even 
about such maligned fields as astrology—one of the areas of claimed 
expertise that Justice Breyer cited in Kumho as a classic example of 
a discipline that “itself lacks reliability.”60 Suppose that a testator left 
a substantial bequest to an institute for the express purpose of “fos-
tering the study of astrology.” The law of wills allows testamentary 
gifts for the purpose of promoting any lawful activity.61 Although 
most Americans may have no faith in astrological predictions,62 the 
study of astrology is perfectly lawful. Assume further that at some 
point after the testator’s death, the heirs bring a challenge, alleging 
that the institute is no longer using the bequeathed funds for the 
purpose specified in the decedent’s will. In addition to hearing testi-
mony about the manner in which the institute was spending the 
funds, the court could undoubtedly accept testimony from experi-
enced astrologers as to whether the funded activities related to “as-
trology,” as that term is generally understood by its avowed practi-
tioners. To adjudicate the dispute, there is no need for the court to 
make a global judgment about the scientific reliability of astrologers’ 
predictions. Rather, the “task at hand” is deciding whether the prof-
fered witness is familiar enough with the state of the discipline to de-
termine whether the funded activities in any way relate to the disci-
pline.  
 The upshot is that despite Justice Breyer’s disparaging comments 
about astrology and necromancy in Kumho, it is neither necessary 
nor sufficient for a judge passing on the admissibility of an expert’s 
testimony to make a global judgment about the general reliability of 
the expert’s discipline. Even if the field has amassed a huge body of 
research verifying many of the propositions relied on by experts in 
the field, the proponent should be required to lay a foundation dem-
onstrating the reliability of the specific technique the expert proposes 
to use to perform the “task at hand.” Conversely, even when the field 
                                                                                                                    
 59. Risinger, supra note 26, at 798-800 (discussing United States v. Fujii, 152 F. 
Supp. 2d 939 (N.D. Ill. 2000)).  
 60. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 151 (1999). 
 61. 79 AM. JUR. 2D Wills § 65 (1975); 95 C.J.S. Wills § 72 (2001). 
 62. ROPER CENTER FOR PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH, Question ID: 
USGALLUP.96SEP3 RO4H 1999 (stating that only 25% of the respondents expressed be-
lief in astrology) (on file with author).  
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has little or no research to validate its leading tenets, the judge can-
not substitute bias for an analysis of the question of whether the 
proponent has laid a foundation demonstrating the reliability of the 
expert’s use of a specific theory or technique to make a particular de-
termination. In short, the judge’s focus ought to be narrow and pre-
cise when the judge defines what must be validated. 
II.   HOW IT MUST BE VALIDATED: THE TRILOGY SHOULD NOT BE 
CONSTRUED AS CONFINING THE PROPONENT TO EMPIRICAL TESTING 
AND INDUCTION AS THE METHOD OF VALIDATION 
 As in the case of the question of what must be validated, the tril-
ogy contains passages implying that the proponent has a heavy bur-
den on the second question. The passages suggest that the re-
quired—or at least preferred—method of validation is empirical test-
ing.63 Justice Blackmun began his list of relevant factors by high-
lighting the “key question . . . [of] . . . whether it can be (and has 
been) tested.”64 In the course of explaining that factor, the Justice 
cited several authorities indicating that he meant testing in the 
sense of controlled, empirical experiments. One citation was to Hem-
pel, asserting that the “statements constituting a scientific explana-
tion must be capable of empirical test.”65 The very next citation is to 
Popper’s declaration that the “criterion of the scientific status of a 
theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability.”66 In his sepa-
rate opinion, the Chief Justice made it clear that he assumed that 
Justice Blackmun was referring to “empirical testing.”67 
A.   The Language of the Opinions in the Trilogy 
 However, the parallel to the trilogy’s treatment of what must be 
validated continues. Once again, the trilogy contains other language 
making it reasonably clear that the Court is not mandating the use 
of controlled empirical testing as the sole or even primary method of 
validating expert testimony. 
 Rather than naively lauding the scientific technique of empirical 
testing, the Daubert Court acknowledged the limits of the scientific 
enterprise.68 The Court rejected the myth of the infallibility of science 
                                                                                                                    
 63. Crump, supra note 29; Jasanoff, supra note 29, at 9, 11-12.  
 64. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993). 
 65. Id. (citing CARL G. HEMPEL, PHILOSOPHY OF NATURAL SCIENCE 49 (Elizabeth & 
Monroe Beardsley eds., 1966)).  
 66. Id. (citing KARL POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF 
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 37 (5th ed. 1989)).  
 67. Id. at 600 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 68. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Evidence Law Visits Jurassic Park: The Far-Reaching 
Implication of the Daubert Court’s Recognition of the Uncertainty of the Scientific Enter-
prise, 81 IOWA L. REV. 55 (1995).  
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and asserted that “arguably, there are no certainties in science.”69 
Empirical induction cannot yield absolute certainty; even when a 
large number of experiments yield observations consistent with the 
truth of an hypothesis, the hypothesis can be accepted only provi-
sionally because there are always other conceivable experiments that 
could be devised.70 The possibility of another experiment raises the 
possibility of subsequent falsification. It would be anomalous if the 
Court demanded reliance on empirical induction in the same opinion 
in which it frankly confronted the limits of that methodology. That 
demand would also be inconsistent with Justice Blackmun’s caution 
that “[t]he inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is, we emphasize, a flexi-
ble one.”71 The Court insisted on “appropriate validation,”72 not con-
trolled experimental validation.  
 The Kumho opinion undercuts any contention that empirical test-
ing and induction are the mandatory or preferred means of validat-
ing expert theories and techniques. Near the beginning of his opin-
ion, Justice Breyer echoes Daubert by reading it as holding that “the 
test of reliability is ‘flexible.’”73 In a later part of the opinion, the 
Justice appeared to concur with the Solicitor General when stating: 
As the Solicitor General points out, there are many different kinds 
of experts, and many different kinds of expertise. See Brief for 
United States as Amicus Curiae 18-19, and n. 5 (citing cases in-
volving experts in drug terms, handwriting analysis, criminal mo-
dus operandi, land valuation, agricultural practices, railroad pro-
cedures, attorney’s fee valuation, and others).74 
Although some of the propositions in these disciplines, such as 
handwriting analysis, can certainly be tested by systematic scientific 
experiments,75 other propositions related to such topics as drug traf-
ficking argot,76 criminal modus operandi,77 and attorney fee valuation 
                                                                                                                    
 69. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.  
 70. Sean O’Connor, The Supreme Court’s Philosophy of Science: Will the Real Karl 
Popper Please Stand Up?, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 263, 270, 272 (1995).  
 71. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.  
 72. Id. at 590. 
 73. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999). 
 74. Id. at 150. 
 75. SCIENCE AND THE LAW, supra note 26, § 4-1.2; see also United States v. White 
Horse, 177 F. Supp. 2d 973 (D.S.D. 2001) (discussing the inadequate testing of parts of the 
Abel Assessment for Sexual Interest).  
 76. Ralph V. Seep, Annotation, Admissibility of Expert Evidence Concerning Meaning 
of Narcotics Code Language in Federal Prosecutions for Narcotics Dealing—Modern Cases, 
104 A.L.R. FED. 230 (1991).  
 77. Phyllis Skloot Bamberger, The Dangerous Expert Witness, 52 BROOK. L. REV. 855 
(1986); Edward J. Imwinkelried & Ephraim Margolin, The Case for the Admissibility of De-
fense Testimony About Customary Political Practices in Official Corruption Prosecutions, 
29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 17-21 (1991); Note, Criteria for Admissibility of Expert Opinion 
Testimony on Criminal Modus Operandi, 1978 UTAH L. REV. 547. 
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do not lend themselves to that mode of validation.78 As the Advisory 
Committee’s Note accompanying the December 1, 2002 amendment 
to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 observes, “[s]ome types of expert tes-
timony will not rely on anything like a scientific method . . . .”79 Ac-
tive drug dealers are highly unlikely to knowingly participate in con-
trolled studies of their jargon or modus operandi, and researchers 
conducting any such studies could run the risk of criminal responsi-
bility for misprision of felony.80 
B.   Generally Held Epistemological Views 
 This broad view of the modes of permissible validation is not only 
consistent with most of the language in the opinions forming the tril-
ogy—as in the case of narrowing the scope of the validation require-
ment to the specific theory or technique the expert relies on—but this 
view is also in accord with widely held epistemological notions. To be 
sure, in some cases empirical testing and induction are an appropri-
ate and adequate means of validation. Suppose that a DNA typing 
laboratory is attempting to determine how much difference can be 
expected in measurements of the length of different DNA sample 
fragments from the same source—the so-called “match window.”81 
That question cannot be answered a priori or by deduction. Rather, 
to validate the match window for its equipment and procedures, the 
laboratory must engage in empirical testing82 and rely on Baconian, 
inductive reasoning. 
 However, that type of reasoning is only one of the recognized 
branches of logic.83 To determine the sum of the degrees in all the 
corners of a square, a person could resort to empirical testing and, af-
ter measuring the degrees in a large number of squares, induce the 
answer.84 Alternatively, though, the person could turn to geometric 
deduction to find the answer. In this situation, mathematical deduc-
tion is not only a viable option, but in some respects, it is superior to 
empirical testing. Standing alone, the latter cannot yield certainty. 
Since there is always the possibility of invalidation in a subsequent 
test,85 induction can yield only probability.86 In contrast, if a proposi-
                                                                                                                    
 78. Michael C. Mason, Comment, The Scientific Evidence Problem: A Philosophical 
Approach, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 887, 901 (2001) (“[E]mpirical testing is impossible for many 
types of [expertise].”).  
 79. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note. 
 80. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 6.9(b) (3d ed. 2000).  
 81. 2 GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 56, § 18-4(B), at 30-31. 
 82. Id. § 18-4(B), at 30.  
 83. SCIENCE IN THE LAW, supra note 26, § 4-1.0.  
 84. ZIMAN, supra note 1, at 163-64.  
 85. O’Connor, supra note 70, at 270, 272.  
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tion is deduced by strict mathematic logic,87 the proposition may be 
regarded as demonstrated or proven.88 
 In other cases, especially in the medical field, extensive, collective 
clinical experience89 can suffice to validate a proposition even when 
the experience cannot be precisely quantified. If tens of physicians 
give the same course of treatment to hundreds of patients suffering 
from similar symptoms and then observe that the symptoms disap-
pear, there is a reasonable inference that the treatment is an effec-
tive cure for the illness evidenced by that constellation of symp-
toms.90 Concededly, unlike some of the phenomena studied in fields 
such as physics, the behavior of patients cannot be reduced to “a pre-
cise logico-mathematical language.”91 In clinical experience with pa-
tients, variables cannot be controlled to the same extent as in a clas-
sic chemistry experiment.92 Yet, as Popper himself noted, the induc-
tive empirical method is essentially “commonsense writ large.”93 
Common sense strongly suggests that extensive clinical experience 
involving a wide range of patients can produce a reliable generaliza-
tion as to the efficacy of a treatment. 
 Furthermore, widespread, collective experience can be an episte-
mologically sound basis for validating an expert proposition, even 
when the experience is compiled by persons lacking formal scientific 
or medical training. The examples abound. In Kumho, Justice Breyer 
appeared to approve of the Solicitor General’s position that testimony 
by undercover police officers about the meaning of drug terms is suf-
ficiently reliable non-scientific expertise.94 The Advisory Committee’s 
Note to the recent amendment to Rule 702 also indicates that the 
courts should be receptive to that type of non-scientific expert testi-
mony.95 Testimony by automobile mechanics provides a further ex-
                                                                                                                    
 86. ALBUREY CASTELL, AN INTRODUCTION TO MODERN PHILOSOPHY 197 (2d ed. 1963) 
(discussing the work of David Hume); see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 
U.S. 579, 590 (1993) (“[A]rguably, there are no certainties in science.”).  
 87. ZIMAN, supra note 1, at 150, 163. 
 88. CASTELL, supra note 86, at 176 (discussing the epistemology of John Locke).  
 89. Kevin Patterson, What Doctors Don’t Know (Almost Everything), N.Y. TIMES MAG., 
May 5, 2002, at 74 (discussing the reliance on clinical experience in developing the medical 
state of the art).  
 90. Before the American Psychiatric Association released the latest version of its di-
agnostic criteria in the current version of The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, the A.P.A. subjected many of the criteria to field trials involving more than 
7,000 subjects at eighty-eight universities and research institutions. William D. Weitzel, 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders Fourth Edition (DSM-IV), 
ADVOCATE, AUG. 1994, at 25-26.  
 91. ZIMAN, supra note 1, at 160.  
 92. Id. at 166-68. 
 93. Id. at 135 (quoting KARL POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 22 (1959) 
(emphasis omitted)).  
 94. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150 (1999). 
 95. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note:   
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ample. The Note to the amendment to Rule 702 asserts that the 
judge may weigh the consideration that “the field of expertise 
claimed by the expert is known to reach reliable results for the type 
of opinion the expert would give.”96 For decades, we have relied on 
automobile mechanics to diagnose engine malfunctions.97 Mechanics 
have rendered diagnostic and repair services that the public has 
found useful—in innumerable instances, mechanics have “fixed” the 
problems that prompted the customer to bring the car to the me-
chanic. There is a common sense inference from this extensive, suc-
cessful experience, even though most of both the mechanics diagnos-
ing and the lay customers relying on the diagnoses lack engineering 
degrees.  
 In summary, the cases forming the trilogy do not require that the 
trial judge demand that the proponent use empirical testing and in-
duction as the sole, or even primary, mode of validation. Any such 
requirement would fly in the face of the general social consensus that 
there are modes of verifying propositions other than controlled scien-
tific experimentation. However, having said that, the challenge re-
mains: developing an affirmative understanding of the meaning of 
“appropriate validation”98 for the proponent’s claim that the expert 
can perform “the task at hand,”99 the specific determination that the 
expert claims to be able to make. That challenge leads us to Part II. 
We recur to the same two questions we began with: What must be 
validated, and how can it be validated? 
                                                                                                                    
[W]hen a law enforcement agent testifies regarding the use of code words in a 
drug transaction, the principle used by the agent is that participants in such 
transactions regularly use code words to conceal the nature of their activities. 
The method used by the agent is the application of extensive experience to ana-
lyze the meaning of the conversations. So long as the principles and methods 
are reliable and applied reliably to the facts of the case, this type of testimony 
should be admitted.  
See also Mark Hansen, Dr. Cop on the Stand, 88 A.B.A. J., May 2000, at 30, 34 (Professor 
David Faigman expressing disappointment at the courts’ willingness to routinely permit 
this type of testimony by “police officers, who have little research or data to support their 
opinions.” Professor Faigman “call[s] for a more discriminating analysis of the scientific 
methods and techniques underlying such testimony. At the very least, he says, the courts 
should inquire into the nature and extent of a police officer’s asserted expertise.”). In this 
regard, Professor Faigman is certainly correct. The trial judge should not presume that 
every police officer has the requisite experience. For that matter, it should not suffice for 
the officer to simply assert that he or she has experience as an undercover agent in illegal 
drug transactions. Rather, the officer should be required to establish that in several such 
drug transactions, he or she has encountered the use of the same or similar code words. 
The question is the witness’s possession of significant, similar experience, not the witness’s 
status as an undercover police officer.  
 96. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note.   
 97. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Evaluating the Reliability of Nonscientific Expert Testi-
mony: A Partial Answer to the Questions Left Unresolved by Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 
52 ME. L. REV. 19, 35, 40 (2000).  
 98. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993).  
 99. Id. at 597. 
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 In order to intelligently answer the question of “appropriate vali-
dation” in sequence, the judge must pose the two questions of what 
and how. 
III.   WHAT MUST BE VALIDATED: THE TRIAL JUDGE SHOULD NOT 
ONLY FOCUS ON THE SPECIFIC CLAIM BEING MADE BY THE EXPERT; 
THE JUDGE SHOULD ALSO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN PURELY  
DESCRIPTIVE AND INFERENTIAL CLAIMS 
 Professor Risinger has helped clarify this area of law with his 
proposal that the trilogy be interpreted as requiring the judge to fo-
cus on the specific theory or technique the expert is relying on, rather 
than a global judgment about the reliability of the expert’s field or 
discipline.100 However, one further refinement is necessary: the 
courts must also identify the particular use to which the expert pro-
poses to put the theory or technique. What is the specific determina-
tion that the expert claims that use of the theory or technique will 
enable the expert to make?  
A.   The Required Foundation as a Variable of the Proponent’s Claim 
 In many areas of evidence law other than expert opinion, the 
courts have long recognized that the required foundation depends not 
only on what item of evidence the proponent is offering, but also on 
the purpose for which the item is proffered.  
 The authentication area is illustrative of this. An accused is 
charged with murder but claims self-defense. At trial, the defense at-
torney contemplates introducing the accused’s testimony that just be-
fore his encounter with the alleged victim, the accused received a 
threatening letter purportedly written by the victim.101 Suppose that 
the defense attorney offered the testimony for the limited purpose of 
showing that the accused had an honest fear of the victim. On that 
theory of logical relevance, it would suffice for the accused to identify 
the letter as one he received. The accused would not have to establish 
that the alleged victim actually wrote the letter. The purpose of the 
evidence is to show the accused’s state of mind.102 Even if the letter is 
a forgery and the accused’s belief about its authorship is mistaken, 
the accused’s receipt of the letter is relevant to substantiate the sub-
jective element of his self-defense claim.  
 However, assume that the defense attorney wants to put the same 
evidence to another use. Now the defense counsel wants to treat the 
letter as evidence that the alleged victim hated the accused and was 
                                                                                                                    
 100. Risinger, supra note 26. 
 101. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Expert Witness: Beyond ‘One Size’, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 28, 
2000, at A18.  
 102. Id. 
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more likely to have started the fight. Although the defense is still of-
fering the same exhibit, the defense would have to lay a quite differ-
ent foundation. The defense will have to establish the victim’s au-
thorship of the letter.103 “The prior foundation is adequate relative to 
the claim about the defendant’s state of mind, but insufficient rela-
tive to the claim about the alleged victim’s state of mind and con-
duct.”104 
 In addition, consider the hearsay area. Assume, for example, that 
the plaintiff has filed a personal injury action against the defendant. 
The plaintiff pedestrian alleges that she was injured on March 1, 
2002, when the brakes on the defendant’s car failed, and the car 
struck the plaintiff. The plaintiff’s complaint seeks both compensa-
tory and punitive damages. As the basis for the punitive damages 
claim, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant was driving recklessly 
in conscious disregard of the risk that his brakes would fail. The 
plaintiff avers that on February 1, 2002, the defendant learned that 
his brakes were defective.  
 At trial, the plaintiff offers an exhibit into evidence. The exhibit 
purports to be a report given to the defendant by an automobile me-
chanic. The report, dated February 1, 2002, explicitly states that the 
brakes on the defendant’s car are “dangerously thin and in need of 
immediate replacement.” The plaintiff could offer the exhibit on her 
punitive damages claim. If the plaintiff proffers this exhibit for the 
limited purpose of establishing the defendant’s notice of the existence 
of the dangerous condition, the exhibit would be nonhearsay.105 The 
plaintiff would be offering the exhibit only to show the effect of the 
contents of the exhibit on the state of mind of the reader; namely, 
putting the defendant on notice of the brake problem.106 If so, the 
only necessary foundation would be proof that the exhibit is a docu-
ment that the mechanic handed the defendant. Alternatively, 
though, the plaintiff might offer the exhibit on her compensatory 
damage claim. If she did so, she would have to establish the truth of 
the report’s assertion that the defendant’s brakes were defective. On 
that theory, the exhibit constitutes hearsay,107 and the plaintiff would 
have to lay a very different foundation to bring the exhibit within the 
business entry hearsay exception.108 In short, the foundation depends 
both on what item of evidence the proponent offers and on which the-
ory of logical relevance the proponent relies. 
                                                                                                                    
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at A18. 
 105. FED. R. EVID. 801(c). 
 106. EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS § 10.02[3][a] (5th ed. 
2002).  
 107. FED. R. EVID. 801(c). 
 108. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 106, § 10.05.  
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 The same holds true in the character evidence area. Change the 
facts in the prior hypothetical. Assume that rather than suing the 
driver, the plaintiff sues the driver’s employer. Once again, her com-
plaint seeks both compensatory and punitive damages. She alleges 
that she was injured as a result of the employee’s careless driving in 
the scope of his employment. Moreover, to support her punitive dam-
age claim, she alleges negligent entrustment. She avers that when 
the defendant hired the employee, the defendant knew or should 
have known that the employee is an habitually careless driver.  
 At trial, during her case-in-chief, the plaintiff calls the driver’s 
former employer. The plaintiff seeks to elicit the former employer’s 
testimony about a number of serious traffic accidents caused by the 
driver while he was in this witness’s employ. If the plaintiff offers 
this testimony solely to show that the driver is a careless driver, the 
only required foundation will be the witness’s personal knowledge 
that the driver caused the prior accidents.109 Given the negligent en-
trustment claim, the employee’s character trait for careless driving is 
in issue,110 and the employee’s prior, specific acts of careless driving 
are admissible to prove that character trait. 111  
 However, assume that the plaintiff wants to offer the identical 
testimony on her punitive damage claim in order to prove that when 
the defendant hired the employee, the defendant knew of the em-
ployee’s propensity. If the plaintiff offers the testimony for that pur-
pose, an additional foundation is necessary; that is, proof that the 
employee’s former employer communicated the information to the de-
fendant before the defendant hired the employee. Again, the nature 
of the required foundation turns on which theory of logical relevance 
the proponent advances, as well as on the content of the proffered 
testimony. 
B.   The Varying Nature of Expert Claims 
 As in the case of the authentication, hearsay, and character rules, 
the requisite foundation for expert testimony ought to vary with the 
purpose for which the evidence is being offered.112 In the past, there 
                                                                                                                    
 109. FED. R. EVID. 602. 
 110. Id. at 405(b).  
 111. James W. McElhaney, Don’t Be Locked Out: The Right Strategy Can Open Doors 
to Evidence That Might Otherwise Be Inadmissible at Trial, 85 A.B.A. J., May 1999, at 64:  
Sue a trucking company for its driver’s negligent injury of a pedestrian, and the 
driver’s bad record for speeding and reckless driving is not admissible in evi-
dence. But change your pleadings to add a count of negligent entrustment of a 
truck to someone the company should have known was a terrible driver, and 
the driver’s record is admissible.  
 112. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Escape Hatches From Frye and Daubert: Sometimes 
You Don’t Need to Lay Either Foundation In Order to Introduce Expert Testimony!, 23 AM. 
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has been an unfortunate tendency to lump together the various uses 
of expert testimony: 
[c]ourts and commentators have tended to refer to a “Daubert 
foundation” as though one size predicate fit all. However, the use 
of the proposed expert testimony at trial determines the propo-
nent’s claim about the expertise. In turn, the claim determines the 
required validation.113 
 The expert’s potential claims about his or her theory or technique 
fall into at least114 two broad categories: descriptive and inferential 
claims. In some cases, the expert merely describes or summarizes115 
experience within his or her field. Suppose, for instance, that in a 
contract lawsuit, there is a dispute over the meaning of a term in the 
written agreement.116 To support her interpretation of the term, the 
plaintiff calls an experienced member of the industry as an expert 
witness. The witness proposes to testify that within the industry, 
there is a trade custom or usage as to the meaning of that term. The 
expert’s specific theory is that the usage exists within the industry. 
So long as the witness testifies that he or she has been a member of 
the industry for a certain period of time and has encountered that 
usage of the term on several occasions by industry members, the 
foundation ought to be deemed adequate.117 Standing alone, that ex-
perience suffices. 
 The same rationale explains the approving mentions of police tes-
timony about drug argot in both Justice Breyer’s Kumho opinion118 
and the 2000 Advisory Committee’s Note to Federal Rule 702.119 That 
                                                                                                                    
J. TRIAL ADVOC. 1, 3-4 (1999); see Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591 
(1993):  
The study of the phases of the moon . . . may provide valid scientific “knowl-
edge” about whether a certain night was dark, and if darkness is a fact in issue, 
the knowledge will assist the trier of fact. However (absent creditable grounds 
supporting such a link), evidence that the moon was full on a certain night will 
not assist the trier of fact in determining whether an individual was unusually 
likely to have behaved irrationally on that night.  
See also FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note (stating the judge should consider 
whether the theory or technique “reach[es] reliable results for the type of opinion the ex-
pert would give”).  
 113. Imwinkelried, supra note 101, at A18. 
 114. Another potential category is normative expert testimony. Risinger, Preliminary 
Thoughts, supra note 38, § 2-2.4. However, such testimony is rarely admitted. See 
generally Richard Delgado & Peter McAllen, The Moralist as Expert Witness, 62 B.U. L. 
REV. 869 (1982).  
 115. Risinger, Preliminary Thoughts, supra note 38, § 2-2.2.6.  
 116. E.g., Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int’l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116 
(S.D.N.Y. 1960).  
 117. Imwinkelried, supra note 101. 
 118. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150 (1999) (“[E]xperts in drug 
terms.”).  
 119. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note:  
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testimony is a variation of the evidence described in the preceding 
paragraph. Drug trafficking is a business. Just as a term can acquire 
a specialized meaning for members of a lawful commercial trade, a 
term can take on a peculiar significance for criminal drug traffickers. 
Hence, just as a veteran member of the meat scrap industry could 
testify as to the meaning of “50% protein” in a lawful contract be-
tween two industry members,120 an experienced undercover officer 
may testify as to the meaning of “lid” in an unlawful agreement for 
the purchase of a contraband drug. As the Advisory Committee’s 
Note states, in this situation “experience alone . . . may . . . provide a 
sufficient foundation for expert testimony.”121 
 However, in other cases the proponent of the expert testimony 
wants the witness to do far more than merely recite or summarize 
experience as to fact A.122 Instead, the proponent contemplates invit-
ing the expert to draw an inference from the witness’s experience. 
The expert evaluates the experience and draws a further inference as 
to fact B. Consider the possible uses, for example, of testimony by a 
psychologist about rape trauma syndrome (RTS).123  
 The proponent could conceivably use such testimony for purely 
descriptive purposes. Assume, for example, that a medical board’s 
certification examination included a number of questions about RTS. 
The board gave a particular applicant a failing grade on the exami-
nation and denied him certification. The applicant later filed suit to 
challenge the examination. In particular, he disputed the accuracy of 
the board’s proposed answer to a question about whether a certain 
phobia is commonly regarded as a symptom of RTS. At the trial of 
that lawsuit, the applicant should be permitted to use the psycholo-
gist’s testimony for descriptive purposes. The psychologist might tes-
tify: He has been a practicing psychologist for twenty years; during 
that time, he has closely followed the RTS literature; and that litera-
ture generally indicates that the phobia in question is not sympto-
matic of RTS. The witness is merely relating or summarizing his ex-
perience within the field. The witness’s specific theory is that there is 
                                                                                                                    
[W]hen a law enforcement agent testifies regarding the use of code words in a 
drug transaction, the principle used by the agent is that participants in such 
transactions  regularly use code words to conceal the nature of their activities. 
The method used by the agent is the application of extensive experience to ana-
lyze the meaning of the conversations. So long as the principles and methods 
are reliable and applied reliably to the facts of the case, this type of testimony 
should be admitted. 
 120. Hurst v. W.J. Lake & Co., 16 P.2d 627, 631 (1932). 
 121. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note.  
 122. Risinger, Preliminary Thoughts, supra note 38, § 2-2.3. For instance, some experts 
translate and illuminate the significance of facts for the trier of fact; “the bulk of expert 
witnesses are called upon to perform some form of translational function.” Id.  
 123. 1 GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 56, § 9-4. 
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a certain belief, custom, or practice in a field, and the witness’s ex-
perience validates that hypothesis.124 
 However, the proponent could put RTS testimony to radically dif-
ferent uses. Suppose, for instance, that the proponent wants to use 
the testimony as credibility evidence.125 The plaintiff files a premises 
liability action against a hotel. The plaintiff alleges that while stay-
ing in one of the defendant’s rooms, the plaintiff was raped due to lax 
hotel security. However, the plaintiff did not report the alleged of-
fense to the police until seventy-two hours after the alleged incident. 
On cross-examination, the defense attorney forces the plaintiff to 
concede the delay in reporting the claimed rape; the suggestion is 
that the delay is pretrial conduct inconsistent with her trial testi-
mony of a rape.126 Later in the plaintiff’s case, the plaintiff calls the 
psychologist to rehabilitate the plaintiff’s credibility. The plaintiff’s 
attorney wants to elicit the witness’s testimony that because of the 
social stigma attached to sexual assault, many rape victims delay re-
porting the offense.  
 Is the prior foundation still adequate for the further credibility in-
ference? The answer is no. The proponent no longer is offering the 
testimony for purely descriptive purposes. The question is not 
whether the RTS profile exists within psychological circles. Rather, 
the proponent wants the witness to draw a credibility inference as to 
a connection between certain conduct (the delay) and a state of mind 
(the person’s honest belief that she has been raped). The prior foun-
dation does not validate the existence of the connection. The expert’s 
specific theory is that if an alleged victim delays reporting a rape but 
otherwise matches the RTS profile, the match strengthens the infer-
                                                                                                                    
 124. Notice that the witness has testified to more than his or her membership in the 
discipline or field. The witness has added that he has had extensive experience reviewing 
the RTS literature. Without more, a witness’s testimony that he or she is a member of the 
pertinent field would not suffice. Even if he or she is a practitioner of a certain discipline, 
he or she may not have had any encounters with the relevant belief, custom, or practice. 
The key question is whether the witness has had a significant number of experiences simi-
lar to the experience involved in the litigation. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Next Step 
After Daubert: Developing a Similarly Epistemological Approach to Ensuring the Reliabil-
ity of Nonscientific Expert Testimony, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2271, 2290-94 (1994) (discussing 
the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of the witness’s experience). 
 There is a similar doctrine with respect to reputation character evidence. If a witness 
proposes testifying about a person’s reputation for a character trait, it is not enough that 
the witness is a member of the same community as the person. In addition, the witness 
must vouch that he or she is familiar with the reputation. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 106, 
§ 6.02[2]. Standing alone, membership in the person’s community does not guarantee that 
the witness has heard any discussions or mention of the person’s character. 
 125. 1 GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 56, § 9-4(B). 
 126. 1 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED ET AL., COURTROOM CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 712, at 267 
(3d ed., Lexis Law Publ’g 1998) (“Like prior inconsistent statements, prior inconsistent acts 
are admissible to impeach.”).  
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ence127 that the victim honestly believes she had been raped. It no 
longer suffices to show that many or most psychologists subscribe to 
the theory that the RTS profile includes certain conduct.  
 Suppose, however, that the witness added the following testi-
mony: 
[I]n his experience and that of other rape counselors, many self-
described rape victims delay reporting the offense [for the stated 
reason of] a sense of embarrassment. Furthermore, when these 
women were treated as rape victims, in most cases their mental 
health improved.128 
It is true that the inference from this collective experience is not in-
disputable; some of the self-described rape victims might have been 
lying.129 However, this successful clinical experience with the ther-
apy130 is highly probative: “[I]f there are numerous reports and an 
evident improvement in the reporter’s mental health in many cases, 
there is a plausible inference that most reporters were subjectively 
truthful.”131 Given this foundation, the testimony is rehabilitative; it 
demonstrates that even many women who subjectively believe that 
they have been raped engage in the seemingly impeaching conduct of 
delayed reporting.  
 Change the facts again. Assume that in the same premises liabil-
ity case, the plaintiff’s attorney calls the psychologist to provide sub-
stantive corroboration that there was a rape. The attorney wants to 
argue that the fact that the plaintiff matches the profile is evidence 
on the merits that a rape occurred.  
 Once again, the original foundation would be inadequate. As in 
the case of the expert drawing the credibility inference, this witness 
proposes to do more than describe his experience that practitioners 
in his specialty accept RTS. Again, the expert’s underlying theory is 
not merely that a certain belief, custom, or practice—the RTS pro-
file—exists within the specialty. This expert contemplates drawing a 
substantive inference as to a connection between certain symptoms 
and the prior occurrence of a particular type of historical event, that 
is, a rape. In this variation, the expert’s specific theory is that if the 
                                                                                                                    
 127. The expert is not claiming that without more, the match either supports an infer-
ence of truthfulness or dictates such an inference. Testimony of the former type would rest 
on the specific theory that if the alleged victim delayed reporting the rape but otherwise 
matched the profile, the match is adequate to prove that the victim honestly believes that 
she was raped. Testimony of the latter sort would be based on the theory that if the alleged 
victim delayed reporting but otherwise matched the profile, the match certainly proved 
that the witness honestly believed that she had been raped. Since the underlying theories 
differ, different—in these cases, additional—validation would be required. 
 128. Imwinkelried, supra note 101, at A18.  
 129. Id. 
 130. State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 230 (Minn. 1982).  
 131. Imwinkelried, supra note 101, at A18.  
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alleged victim delayed reporting but otherwise matched the RTS pro-
file, the match strengthens the inference that there was a rape. The 
original foundation falls even shorter here.  
 Even the foundation, embellished with testimony about numerous 
successful clinical interventions based on the RTS diagnosis, would 
be inadequate. Together with evidence of such clinical success, a 
large database consisting of self-reports of claimed rape victims can 
support the credibility inference. However, to establish that a syn-
drome extracted from the database is an accurate profile of rape vic-
tims, there must be some showing of the truth of the reports included 
in the database–emergency room reports that the reporters displayed 
physical signs of violent sexual assault, police reports that post-
report investigations led to confessions of sexual assault, or perhaps 
convictions on rape charges prompted by the reports. The clinical 
successes may justify the credibility inference; but in the clinical 
mental health context, treatment often depends on the patient’s be-
liefs “even though [the patient’s subjective] beliefs about her illness 
[or the precipitating events] are entirely erroneous.”132 Here, though, 
the plaintiff’s attorney wants to use the profile substantively as “a 
fact-finding tool.”133 The attorney should be permitted to do so only if 
the expert can demonstrate that the reports used to generate the 
RTS profile are in fact based on rapes. Relative to this substantive 
claim, even the embellished foundation is lacking.  
IV.   HOW MUST IT BE VALIDATED?: IN THE CASE OF INFERENTIAL 
CLAIMS, THE TRIAL JUDGE SHOULD ASK WHETHER THE PROPONENT’S 
FOUNDATIONAL SHOWING OF THE RESULTS OF USING THE EXPERT’S 
THEORY OR TECHNIQUE WOULD CONVINCE A SKEPTICAL RATIONALIST 
THAT ITS USE ENABLES THE EXPERT TO ACCURATELY MAKE THE 
SPECIFIC DETERMINATION TO WHICH THE EXPERT PROPOSES 
TESTIFYING 
 As we have seen, the validation of purely descriptive expert claims 
is a relatively straightforward matter. As the 2002 Advisory Commit-
tee’s Note points out, “experience alone” can be adequate validation 
for this type of claim.134 If the witness has had a large135 number of 
similar136 experiences as to fact A, the witness ought to be permitted 
to describe or summarize that body of experience for the jury.  
                                                                                                                    
 132. Eugene E. Levitt, The Use of Hypnosis to ‘Freshen’ the Memory of Witnesses or Vic-
tims, 17 TRIAL 56, 58 (1981).  
 133. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 230.  
 134. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note. 
 135. Imwinkelried, supra note 124, at 2290-92 (discussing Hume’s insistence upon “a 
repetition of similar” experiences). 
 136. Id. at 2292-94.  
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 However, as Section III.A indicated, the foundational hurdle is 
higher when the expert wants to do more than vouch for the exis-
tence of a belief, custom, or practice within the discipline or field. For 
example, when a psychologist proposes relying on the RTS profile as 
the basis for a further inference as to credibility or historical events, 
a different foundation is necessary. How should a trial judge assess 
the adequacy of such a foundation under the trilogy? 
A.   A Proposed Standard for Inferential Claims 
 It is submitted that to assess the adequacy of the foundation, the 
trial judge should demand a showing of the results of the use of the 
expert’s theory or technique and then inquire whether a skeptical ra-
tionalist would consider that showing sufficient to demonstrate that 
the theory or technique “works,” namely, that it enables the expert to 
accurately make the inference the expert proposes to draw on the 
witness stand. 
 To begin with, the judge should adopt the stance of a skeptic. By 
that, I do not mean a total skeptic who believes as a matter of epis-
temology that we cannot be confident that we know anything.137 
Rather, I mean a person with a critical mind, who does not accept as-
sertions at face value. That has long been the mindset of the law of 
evidence. “In the everyday affairs of business and social life,” if you 
receive a letter purporting to come from a particular sender, you 
typically assume that the purported author is the sender.138 In con-
trast, both the common law of evidence139 and modern evidence stat-
utes such as the Federal Rules140 adopt a different approach, requir-
ing an affirmative showing of the authenticity of the letter. The very 
existence of the authentication requirement is perhaps the best evi-
dence that “the common law [of evidence is] imbued with a spirit of 
skepticism.”141 
 The trilogy reflects that skeptical attitude. For its part, Daubert 
rejects the traditional, general acceptance test.142 The Daubert court 
took the position that even if the entire specialty community vouches 
for a theory or technique, the collective ipse dixit is insufficient; ac-
cording to Daubert, the trial judge can and should demand more by 
way of validation. Joiner applies the same questioning attitude to the 
individual expert. As previously stated, the Joiner Court declared 
that “nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence re-
                                                                                                                    
 137. ZIMAN,  supra note 1, at 109.  
 138. 2 MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 218, at 37 (5th ed. 1999).  
 139. Id. 
 140. FED. R. EVID. 104(b), 901(a). 
 141. CARLSON ET AL., EVIDENCE: TEACHING MATERIALS FOR AN AGE OF SCIENCE AND 
STATUTES 187 (5th ed. 2002).  
 142. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 585-89 (1993). 
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quires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to . 
. . data only by the ipse dixit of the [individual] expert”143—a state-
ment reiterated in Kumho.144 Neither the word of the individual ex-
pert nor even the collective word of his or her colleagues is adequate 
for the skeptical mind.  
 In the grand scheme of American evidence law, the judge ruling 
on admissibility is not only a skeptic, he or she is also a rationalist in 
the tradition of empiricism founded by John Locke, the seventeenth 
century English philosopher.145 Enlightenment Rationalism had a 
profound effect on British and then American evidence law.146 In par-
ticular, Locke’s empirical epistemology influenced many of the most 
important writers on evidence doctrine, including Gilbert,147 Ben-
tham,148 Wills,149 and Best.150 To one degree or another, nearly all the 
leading Anglo-American writers on evidence have embraced these 
basic epistemological views.151 Their writings and the judicial opin-
ions influenced by their writings gave birth to the celebrated Ration-
alist Tradition in evidence law.152 
 The essence of Lockean empiricism153 was his belief, stated in the 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding, that all our knowledge is 
founded in experience.154 The tradition determines which modes of 
reasoning are considered valid.155 For instance, in Book I of his essay, 
Locke repudiated the notion that certain ideas are innate to the hu-
man mind.156 Instead, as Locke explained in Book II,157 knowledge 
had to be derived directly or indirectly from experience.158 As a result 
of experience, we directly gain “sheer data”159 in the form of sensa-
tions. Upon careful reflection,160 we can draw indirect, reliable infer-
ences from the sheer data.161 However, in Locke’s view empirical in-
ference encompassed more than strictly scientific experiments.162 
                                                                                                                    
 143. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).  
 144. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 157 (1999).  
 145. WILLIAM TWINING, RETHINKING EVIDENCE: EXPLORATORY ESSAYS 71-72 (1990). 
 146. Id. at 74. 
 147. Id. at 35. 
 148. Id. at 38. 
 149. Id. at 47. 
 150. Id. at 48.  
 151. Id. at 40.  
 152. Id. at 32-91. 
 153. Id. at 83 n.26.  
 154. CASTELL, supra note 86, at 170-71.  
 155. Id. at 178; see also TWINING, supra note 145, at 80. 
 156. CASTELL, supra note 86, at 170-71. 
 157. Id. at 183-84.  
 158. Id. at 175-77.  
 159. Id. at 176. 
 160. Id. at 175.  
 161. Id. at 176.  
 162. Id. at 171.  
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Both experts and laypersons are viewed as possessing the cognitive 
competence to draw trustworthy inferences from experiential data.163 
 In gauging the adequacy of the proponent’s foundation, what 
question should this skeptical, rationalist decision-maker ask? The 
skeptical, rationalist judge must demand proof that the expert’s spe-
cific theory or technique works; that is, the use of the theory or tech-
nique enables the expert to accurately make the inferential determi-
nation that the expert contemplates testifying to. As one of the lead-
ing commentators on expert testimony, Professor Paul Giannelli, has 
pointed out, when the concern is the “validity” of a theory or tech-
nique, the essential question is whether the theory or technique en-
ables the expert to determine what he or she claims that it helps de-
termine—“its accuracy.”164 The wording of Federal Rule of Evidence 
901 is instructive. Subdivision 901(a) codifies the general require-
ment that proponents authenticate their evidence. In the words of 
the statute, “The requirement of authentication . . . as a condition 
precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to sup-
port a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent 
claims.”165 Subdivision 901(b)(9) expressly extends the requirement to 
“[e]vidence describing a process or system used to produce a result 
and showing that the process or system produces an accurate re-
sult.”166 The accompanying Advisory Committee’s Note gives two sci-
entific instruments, X-rays and computers, as illustrations of the 
reach of (b)(9).167 As the statute and Note indicate, the mark that the 
theory or technique must hit is accuracy.  
 What evidence should the trial judge weigh in resolving the cru-
cial question of whether the theory or technique enables the expert to 
accurately make the inferential determination? Consistently with the 
mindset of empiricism, the judge ought to focus on the evidence of 
the results of the use of the theory or technique. In the macrocosm of 
society, why do we place faith in science? We do so in large part be-
cause there is an “immense body of results”168 proving “its worth in 
the realm of material technique.”169 Those concrete results—science’s 
many practical,170 successful applications171 and technological 
                                                                                                                    
 163. TWINING, supra note 145, at 80. 
 164. Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United 
States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1201 n.20 (1980); see also United 
States v. Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 553 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (exploring the accuracy of the fin-
gerprinting technique).  
 165. FED. R. EVID. 901(a). 
 166. Id. at 901(b)(9). 
 167. Id. at 901 advisory committee’s note; see Edward J. Imwinkelried, Judge Versus 
Jury: Who Should Decide Questions of Preliminary Facts Conditioning the Admissibility of 
Scientific Evidence?, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 577, 607-10 (1984).  
 168. ZIMAN, supra note 1, at 6-7.  
 169. Id. at 2. 
 170. Id. at 127. 
760  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:735 
 
achievements172—are the pragmatic173 basis for the belief in the valid-
ity of systematic experimental testing and induction.  
 In the microcosm of the courtroom as well, the focus should be on 
results. The Supreme Court reflected that focus in the trilogy. In his 
list of factors in Daubert, Justice Blackmun stated that “the court or-
dinarily should consider the known or potential rate of error.”174 Of 
course, the only way to ascertain that rate is to use the theory or 
technique and then to observe the results of that use. In Kumho, Jus-
tice Breyer asserted that in evaluating the reliability of an expert’s 
methodology, the judge should consider “how often an . . . expert’s . . . 
methodology has produced erroneous results.”175 Moreover, the 2000 
Advisory Committee’s Note to amended Rule 702 states that a perti-
nent consideration is the “results” reached when the theory or tech-
nique is utilized.176 
B.   Illustrative Applications of the Proposed Standard 
 Under this proposed standard, how should a judge rule on the fol-
lowing states of the record? 
 The proponent’s foundation consists of only the expert’s personal 
voucher that the theory or technique is valid. Joiner and Kumho 
supply the answer here. Joiner teaches that the trial judge need not 
accept the “ipse dixit” of an individual expert,177 and Kumho reaffirms 
that teaching.178 That teaching is in accord with the skeptical spirit of 
American evidence law. The trial judge should not simply take the 
expert’s word for the validity of the theory or technique.179 
 Suppose that the proponent supplements the foundation with ad-
ditional testimony that the vast majority of the specialists in the field 
believe that the theory or technique is valid. Now Daubert controls. 
There Justice Blackmun rejected general acceptance within the rele-
vant specialist discipline as a dispositive consideration.180 In Kumho, 
Justice Breyer indicated that even a collective voucher by the practi-
tioners of either astrology or necromancy would not suffice.181 For its 
                                                                                                                    
 171. Id. at 10. 
 172. Id. at 127.  
 173. Id. at 10. 
 174. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993).  
 175. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 151 (1999).  
 176. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note (“Whether the field of expertise 
claimed by the expert is known to reach reliable results for the type of opinion the expert 
would give.”).  
 177. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997). 
 178. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 146.  
 179. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1319 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(approvingly quoted in FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note). 
 180. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 585-89 (1993).  
 181. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 151.  
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part, the Advisory Committee’s Note to the 2000 amendment to Rule 
702 states that a general voucher by the practitioners of clinical ecol-
ogy would be an inadequate foundation.182 That statement is also 
consistent with the skeptical attitude with which the trial judge 
should approach the proponent’s foundation. 
 Assume that the proponent goes farther and offers at least some 
instances of results indicating that on occasion, reliance on the the-
ory or technique has permitted an expert to accurately make the in-
ferential determination that the witness proposes to draw on the 
stand. One or a few isolated anecdotes should not suffice.183 While a 
handful of successful results may warrant a serious, larger-scale in-
vestigation into the validity of the theory or technique,184 scanty an-
ecdotal evidence is inadequate as a foundation. Empiricists, such as 
the eighteenth century Scottish philosopher David Hume, insisted 
upon a showing of “many instances”—a definite pattern of consistent 
outcomes—before they were willing to infer a relationship or connec-
tion.185 
 Alternatively, suppose that the proponent can show that the the-
ory or technique has been repeatedly used. Is that showing satisfac-
tory as a foundation? The answer must be no when the expert is 
making an inferential claim. The longstanding use of the technique 
or theory is persuasive evidence that the members of that field accept 
the theory or technique, but general acceptance suffices only when 
the expert’s claim is descriptive in nature. Before embracing an in-
ferential claim about the theory or technique, an empiricist should 
demand proof of the results of its use.186 Again, both Daubert187 and 
Kumho188 manifested concern about the results of reliance on the 
theory or technique. That concern is relevant in several forensic set-
tings, including polygraphy and arson analysis. In some of the re-
search cited in support of the admissibility of polygraph evidence, 
there were no follow-up studies to independently verify that the po-
lygraphist’s conclusion was correct.189 Although the polygraph has 
                                                                                                                    
 182. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note (citing Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. 
Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988) (rejecting testimony based on ‘clinical ecology’ as un-
founded and unreliable)).  
 183. Cavallo v. Star Enter., 100 F.3d 1150, 1158-59 (4th Cir. 1996).  
 184. Marc Sageman, Challenging the Admissibility of Mental Expert Testimony, 13 
PRAC. LITIGATOR 7, 8 (2002).  
 185. CASTELL, supra note 86, at 191-93; see also FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory commit-
tee’s note (stating that in assessing the adequacy of the proponent’s foundation, the judge 
should consider whether “the expert has unjustifiably extrapolated”).  
 186. ZIMAN, supra note 1, at 6, 10, 46, 75. 
 187. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993). 
 188. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 151 (1999). 
 189. Michael Abell, Polygraph Evidence: The Case Against Admissibility in Federal 
Criminal Trials, in SCIENTIFIC AND EXPERT EVIDENCE 825, 835-36 (Edward J. Imwinkel-
ried ed., 2d ed. 1981); 1 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW 
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been used extensively for decades, an empiricist would not treat 
these studies as adequate validation without a showing of the accu-
rate use of the technique, namely, the “ground truth”190 of the exam-
iners’ findings. Arson analysts’ opinions are vulnerable to the same 
type of doubt. Arson investigators rely on certain clues such as con-
crete “spalling”191 and char depth192 to determine the point of origin of 
a fire. These clues are plausible and widely accepted by fire depart-
ment arson investigators.193  The difficulty, though, is that there have 
been few “full-scale burns” of buildings to verify that such factors ac-
curately identify the starting place of a fire.194 To make matters 
worse, “[n]othing in the natural world ‘tests’ an arson investigator’s 
expertise. If an arson investigator is wrong, nothing runs aground or 
burns down.”195 These clues are in widespread use, but there is little 
objective evidence that their use yields accurate results. Without any 
effort to detect error and evaluate the results of the use of the tech-
nique, the analysts might simply be repeating the same mistakes 
over and over again.  
 In the above states of the record, given the Supreme Court’s tril-
ogy of decisions, without more the trial judge should rule the founda-
tion inadequate. At the polar extreme, however, there are many 
foundational showings that the judge should rule sufficient.  
 In light of the Daubert Court’s emphasis on scientific testing, in-
duction from empirical tests is certainly an acceptable method of 
validating an expert theory or technique. The ideal situation is one in 
which: The expert constructs a large database;196 the database is rep-
resentative of the relevant universe;197 the test was conducted under 
conditions approximating those in the pending case;198 and the error 
rate is negligible.199 When the proponent’s foundation paints that im-
pressive a picture of the state of the scientific research supporting 
the theory or technique, the judge ought to allow the proponent to 
submit the theory or technique to the trier of fact. The courts often 
                                                                                                                    
AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY §§ 14-2.2.1, 14-3.2.3, 14-3.2.6, 14-3.3.2, 14-3.3.3 
(1997); 1 GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 56, § 8-3, at 378.  
 190. 1 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 189, § 14-3.3.2[3]. 
 191. 2 GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 56, § 26-4(A), at 557. 
 192. Id. § 26-4(A), at 556. 
 193. Id. § 26-4(A).  
 194. Vincent Brannigan & Jose Torero, The Expert’s New Clothes: Arson ‘Science’ After 
Kumho Tire, 43 FIRE CHIEF 60 (1999) (the authors are professors in the Department of 
Fire Protection Engineering at the University of Maryland).  
 195. Id. at 61. 
 196. EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE METHODS OF ATTACKING SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 
10-6(a) (3d ed., Lexis Law Publ’g 1997). 
 197. Id. § 10-6(b), at 297-98. 
 198. Id. § 10-6(b), at 298. 
 199. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 151 (1999); Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993).  
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encounter such foundations for genetic marker analysis, such as 
DNA typing.200  
 Although the classic technique of experimental testing and induc-
tion is a permissible method of validation, that technique does not 
exhaust the possibilities. Members of the empirical school of episte-
mology recognized other valid modes of reasoning such as mathe-
matical deduction.201 If algebraic or geometric reasoning demon-
strates the logical necessity of a proposition, that demonstration 
would be acceptable to an empirical epistemologist; and the same 
demonstration should be adequate as a foundation in court.  
 However, assume that the proponent calls neither a molecular bi-
ologist nor a mathematician as her expert witness. Rather, the pro-
ponent invites an automobile mechanic to testify as an expert on en-
gine malfunctions. Although the mechanic’s academic background 
might not be as impressive as that of the biologist or the statistician, 
this evidence should also be ruled admissible. There is far more than 
the bare fact that for decades, mechanics have used their techniques 
of automotive diagnosis and repair. In addition, during that period of 
time car owners have come to rely on mechanics to diagnose and re-
pair engine malfunctions.202 The point is that car owners have turned 
to mechanics for such a lengthy period of time precisely because they 
have generally been satisfied with the results of the mechanics’ ex-
pert diagnosis and work. In a large number of cases, the mechanics 
succeeded in eliminating or reducing the problem that caused the 
owner to consult the mechanic in the first instance.203 The mechanics’ 
lay customers themselves are not experts; but, as previously stated, 
rationalist epistemologists agree that laypersons also possess the 
cognitive competence to evaluate results and draw inferences from 
empirical observations.204 
 These two sets of hypotheticals represent polar extremes on the 
spectrum of cases that will be presented to judges. Under the stan-
dard proposed at the outset of this Subpart, the proper outcome in 
these hypotheticals is fairly clear cut. However, other fact situations 
will fall in the middle of the spectrum. These fact situations can pose 
difficult, close calls for the trial judge. Joiner was such a case. There 
the plaintiffs presented several, large polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) 
studies.205 Yet, like the trial judge, the Court was concerned about 
                                                                                                                    
 200. 2 GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 56, § 18-3(C), at 21-22 (reviewing some 
of the research validating the short tandem repeat (STR) method of DNA typing).  
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the dissimilarities between the facts of the pending case and the test 
conditions in the studies: The plaintiff was an adult human being 
while the animal studies involved infant mice; the mice had received 
massive doses, but, relative to body size, the plaintiff’s exposure was 
“far less”;206 the plaintiff’s exposure was dermal while the doses were 
injected into the mice; and the plaintiff developed a small-cell carci-
noma, but the mice had alveologenic adenomas. Given those dissimi-
larities, the Court concluded that the trial judge did not abuse his 
discretion in barring the testimony. However, before sustaining the 
lower court ruling, the Court went to lengths to underscore that on 
review, the standard is abuse of discretion.207 Pointedly, concurring 
in part and dissenting in part, Justice Stevens added: “it bears em-
phasis that the Court has not held that it would have been an abuse 
of discretion to admit the expert testimony.”208 The standard pro-
posed in this Subpart should reduce the uncertainty in this area of 
law, but there will still be cases such as Joiner, presenting the courts 
with tough judgment calls.  
V.   CONCLUSION 
 Daubert is a landmark decision. Much of the attention for the de-
cision has been devoted to the Court’s formal holdings that the gen-
eral acceptance test is no longer good law and that Rule 702 requires 
a validation foundation for scientific testimony. However, the real 
significance of the opinion may lie in the Court’s frank recognition of 
the limits of the scientific enterprise.209 With the benefit of a number 
of amicus briefs filed by scientific organizations,210 the Court moved 
beyond the flawed, popular notion that at least the hard sciences can 
yield absolute certainty.211 The Court confronted the reality that 
there are erratic phenomena that defy even the most meticulous ap-
plication of the scientific method.212 Citing the amicus briefs, Justice 
Blackmun therefore wrote that “arguably, there are no certainties in 
science.”213 Daubert should help to disabuse the lower courts from a 
simplistic faith in the scientific method. It would be ironic if the tril-
ogy, begun in Daubert, was interpreted as standing for the proposi-
tion that the scientific method is the only method of validating expert 
                                                                                                                    
 206. Id. at 144. 
 207. Id. at 139, 141-43. 
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testimony or even that there is a bias in favor of empirical testing 
and induction. 
 “[W]e have cast off the naive doctrine that all science is necessar-
ily true . . . .”214 It is silly to presume that at any given time, all the 
propositions circulating within the scientific community—or even the 
specialized scientific communities of biology, chemistry, or physics—
are sufficiently validated. Quite to the contrary, the discourse in any 
scientific circle is likely to include a mix of long validated proposi-
tions, newly validated ones, conjectures, and propositions that have 
already been discredited.215 In that light, the answer to the question, 
“What must be validated?,” should be clear. The focus must be on the 
specific theory or technique that the expert proposes to rely on to per-
form “the task at hand,”216 the determination the expert contemplates 
testifying about.  
 We have also “cast off the [equally] naive doctrine that . . . all true 
knowledge is necessarily scientific.”217 In the long term, perhaps the 
most important insight in Daubert is the Court’s recognition of the 
fallibility and inherent limitations of scientific methodology. Anglo-
American evidence law rests on empiricist epistemology. That school 
of epistemology recognizes the validity of modes of reasoning other 
than scientific induction. Mathematical deduction is also permissible, 
and even laypersons are viewed as possessing the cognitive compe-
tence to draw reliable inferences from sensory data. An answer to the 
question, “How must it be validated?,” thus emerges. If the expert 
makes a limited, descriptive claim, there is adequate validation when 
the foundation demonstrates that the expert has had a large number 
of similar experiences. When the expert makes an inferential claim, 
the question becomes whether the proponent has made a showing of 
the results of the use of the theory or technique that would convince 
a skeptical rationalist that the theory or technique accurately does 
what the expert claims. 
 It would be a grave mistake to interpret the trilogy as if it man-
dated that the judge assess expert foundations from the narrow per-
spective of the scientific tradition. Rather, the trilogy should be read 
through the broader lens of the Rationalist Tradition of Anglo-
American evidence law.218 Prescribing a scientific perspective might 
simplify the trial judge’s task; in many cases, it will be perfectly clear 
that the proponent’s foundation does not qualify as controlled, ex-
perimental verification. However, adopting that perspective will also 
result in the exclusion of a vast amount of evidence that satisfies 
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empirical epistemology, as Locke conceived it. Ease of use makes a 
narrow scientific perspective tempting; but as Justice Breyer wisely 
cautioned in Kumho, “Too much depends upon the particular circum-
stances of the particular case at issue.”219 Unlike dogmatic220 scien-
tism, the Rationalist Tradition has the intellectual breadth and flexi-
bility to accommodate those myriad circumstances.  
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